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Key MessAGes 
 The Green Climate Fund is becoming a key UNFCCC climate finance institution, which 
 aims to make a “significant and ambitious contribution” to global mitigation efforts.
 Renewable energy Feed-in Tariffs (REFIT) have been highly effective in many countries,  
 and provide a proven example of a results-based climate finance instrument, if tuned  
 carefully over time to be sustainable. 
 A Renewable Energy FIT Facility or Fund at the GCF Private Sector Facility would be an  
 ideal institutional home to implement REFITs at scale in developing countries.
 A prompt start of pilot activities should be implemented to build experience, including  
 on how to measure, report and verify mitigation impacts of REFITs as supported  
 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) by developing countries.
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From Anders wijkman and stefan schurig:
The climate scientists unfortunately leave no doubt. The 5th Assessment Report of the  
International Panel on Climate Change of the United Nations (IPCC) launched in  
September 2013 states: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal and since the 
1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.  
The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, 
sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”1  
It is common knowledge that developing countries are most vulnerable to the devastating 
impacts of climate change already taking place in many parts of the world. However, it 
is equally important to mention that addressing the causes of human-induced climate 
change, chief among them the combustion of fossil fuels, would also risk making poverty 
reduction more difficult – and expensive – for low-income countries, not least in Africa. 
Investments in alternatives to fossil fuels may still appear to be more expensive too many 
observers, at least seen in a short-term perspective. 
This being said, developments in both renewables and energy efficiency technologies have 
been very promising in the recent past. Over time, the costs for solar, wind and efficient 
biomass have been reduced significantly. This means that there are great opportunities 
to accelerate the economic development of many developing countries along a green 
trajectory. Transforming the energy infrastructure towards low-carbon technologies in both 
industrialized and developing countries is a critical component of the climate change 
action program that is absolutely necessary to prevent dangerous climate change. 
With this report the WFC offers a timely and concrete contribution to the emerging design 
and architecture of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The objective of the GCF is to  
”promote a paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development  
pathways by providing support to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change.” 2The suggestions in this 
report are perfectly designed to meet this objective.
This report offers institutional design options – renewable energy feed-in tariffs - that would 
allow rapid implementation of renewable energy technologies in developing countries.  
A key element is that funding support through the feed-in tariffs would only be distributed 
against performance, i.e once the renewable energy technology provides electric power to 
the communities in need.    
Anders wijkman is a member of the World Future Council, co-president of the Club 
of Rome, former president of Globe EU and has been active on environmental and 
development issues for many years. As a member of the European Parliament 
(1999–2009) he focused on issues related to climate change, environment, development 
cooperation and humanitarian affairs. He is a former assistant secretary general of 
the United Nations and policy director of the UN Development Program. Wijkman is a 
member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
stefan schurig is Director Climate Energy at the World Future Council. He initiated the  
international policy campaign on renewable energy and the worldwide promotion of 
‘Feed-in tariffs’ policies. In 2004 he was appointed member of the REALISE Forum, an 
international platform on renewable energy policies led by the European Commission. 
Schurig authored and co-authored numerous publications on climate and energy issues 
including the concept-proposal for a Renewable Energy Policy Fund (2009). He works as  
a direct advisor for governments and parliamentarians around the globe. 
1 IPCC WGI AR5 SPM-36 27 September 2013
2 www.gcffund.net
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Transforming the energy infrastructure towards low-carbon technologies in both industri-
alized and developing countries is a critical part of the global greenhouse gas mitigation 
efforts that are necessary to limit dangerous climate change. Renewable Energy Feed-in 
tariffs (REFIT) have been crucial policy instruments to rapidly expand renewable electricity 
generation in Europe, and have been taken up in a rapidly increasing number of countries 
outside Europe in the last years. This policy paper argues that the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) should become a key UNFCCC vehicle to support further diffusion of REFITs in 
developing countries to a level that mobilizes the hundreds of gigawatts of renewable  
energies required for a 2° C stabilization scenario. The GCF aims at making a “significant 
and ambitious contribution” to these efforts, guided by the principles of the UNFCCC.  
As the GCF is currently still emerging, we offer institutional design options that would 
allow facilitating rapid implementation, provided there is a sufficient capitalization. 
REFITs are fully consistent with the spirit of results-based financing and could be  
embedded within the GCF’s Private Sector Facility (PSF). For an effective, efficient,  
flexible and scalable design, several important aspects require consideration. It is key to 
decide on the criteria for the support of REFITs ex ante, i.e. a tariff level that does not  
lead to overfunding, precise definitions of eligible technologies that prevent an exaggerated 
level of rent-seeking, a sufficient duration of REFIT payments in order to   investments, 
availability of grid or mini-grid access and guarantees of payment from the off-taker, as  
well as credibility of the institution disbursing the REFIT. These criteria need to be differ-
entiated in order to address different country circumstances. A critical question is how the 
modalities of a REFIT mechanism can be made compatible with (enhanced) direct access 
models to the GCF. A REFIT Committee could decide on applications from governments, 
but is likely to need evaluation support by independent expert reviewers or auditors.  
Even in a medium-sized country, a REFIT can trigger very large renewable energy invest-
ments of gigawatt (GW) scale, and thus the cost differential to conventional energy could 
reach several hundred million  per year. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate the share of 
cost differential covered by the GCF according to country groups. LDCs could be entitled 
to coverage of the full differential, whereas the covered share would decline in middle 
income countries and advanced developing countries, respectively. The institutional setting 
would have to enable a transparent, but rapid adjustment of the REFIT support payment 
over time to prevent inefficiencies of REFIT support seen in several European systems.
Given that progress in the operationalization of the GCF currently is slow, a trust fund for 
a pilot phase of REFIT support could be set up quickly by a progressive group of donor 
governments in order to allow a rapid start. A trust fund of 1 billion  could finance 
1-3 GW of renewables (see section 5). The trust fund should be designed with the clear  
aim of serving as a pilot phase for a REFIT funding window of the PSF.
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In light of the magnitude of the challenge of financing mitigation and adaptation efforts in 
the developing world, a critical challenge is how to ensure that financial flows to develop-
ing countries achieve the envisaged outcome cost-effectively. 
Internationally, renewable energy feed-in tariffs (REFITs) have proven to be an effective 
means to rapidly increase the generation of renewable electricity; they have clearly outcom-
peted renewable quota trading systems, tender programmes or direct investment subsidies. 
REFITs have spread beyond industrialized countries and were applied by 65 countries 
and 27 states worldwide (GCF 2013d: 2) worldwide as of 2012. Therefore, REFITs have 
been instrumental to advance progress in renewable energy technology development, by 
enabling economy of scale effects to bring costs down more rapidly than even optimists 
had anticipated. Becker and Fischer’s (2013) assessment of China, India and South Africa 
shows, however, that these large countries have preferred auction-based tariffs instead of 
classical FITs. Still, as long as there is a minimum level of confidence in government insti-
tutions, the strong advantage of REFITs compared to other renewables support policies is 
to provide investment security given that the tariff usually is made available for 10-20 years 
and there is a guarantee that the power produced will actually be taken by the grid operator 
and remunerated. This then induces financial institutions to provide loans to renewable 
power producers and leads to the emergence of a renewable electricity “ecosystem”. This 
certainty is a critical aspect of the effectiveness of REFITs due to the long periods of time 
that are typically needed for energy production infrastructure development.
In many countries, REFITs are generally financed by a supplement to the electricity tariff 
of final users. This means that the end-users subsidize the additional cost of the REFIT as 
in many countries energy-intensive industry has been exempt in order to safeguard compet-
itiveness. There has not been relevant opposition to this system, except in Germany where 
the surcharge has become so high that it now constitutes a significant share of the end 
user electricity cost. If available, however, this surcharge could also be replaced with other 
sources of funding.
Therefore, regarding efficiency of the policy scheme, the key challenge for REFITs is to 
avoid “overfunding” which could result if the electricity generation costs of renewable 
technologies fall while the REFIT is not adjusted in a timely manner. Such situations have 
occurred in the context of solar PV in Germany, Italy and Spain. Overfunding led to a 
massive expansion of renewable capacities. A simultaneous decrease in wholesale electricity 
prices and excessive exemptions for industry increased the consumer-financed cost differ-
ential, which raised concerns about energy costs. Policy-makers then overreacted, slashing 
REFITs to levels at which even the most efficient companies could not build renewable 
energy capacities. 
As the availability of domestic finance is often a key barrier to rolling out REFITs in de-
veloping countries, there have been several attempts to introduce an international support 
scheme for REFITs. In 2009, the World Future Council was among the first to propose a 
“Renewable Energy Policy Fund”, which would allow for replicating the positive experi-
ences with REFITs in developing countries, financed from a range of innovative sources, 
including Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (WFC 2009). 
Building on this proposal, Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors proposed the GET FiT 
programme where grants and concessional loans would be given for FITs, combined with 
risk mitigation strategies through international guarantees and insurance, as well as techni-
cal assistance to address non-financial barriers (Deutsche Bank 2011). In countries in which 
7there are grid integration constraints or technologies have a limited in-country track record, 
“lighthouse” power purchase agreements can pave the way for fully-fledged subsequent 
REFITs. Currently, GET FiT is piloting its concept in Uganda (see 3.2). 
Even beyond REFITs, “results-based financing” (RBF) is becoming increasingly relevant for 
international climate finance and renewable energy initiatives. For example, the Norwegian 
initiative Energy+ requires the introduction of a policy instrument such as feed-in tariffs, 
renewable certificate, off-take guarantee, tax exemption or tender programmes to trigger 
initial payments, followed by payments for measurable performance such as renewable 
energy produced (Norwegian government 2012). Given that international climate finance 
is slated to reach a level of 100 billion USD per year by 2020, a disbursement modality to 
maximize mitigation benefits is crucial. This is even more important as carbon markets that 
provided a performance-based benefit for mitigation initiatives are currently suffering from 
a meltdown of prices for emission credits, and thus currently do not provide a relevant 
incentive anymore. 
ESMAP (2013) summarizes when and under which circumstances RBF is desirable in the 
context of the energy sector. They find that RBF is appropriate to allocate payments for 
environmental services, and that it increases the probability of achieving desired results.  
On the other hand, it could increase project costs, as the project developers will want to  
ensure that the projects perform, and will require interim – often commercial – financing 
with a higher interest rate, before RBF resources start to materialize. Monitoring and verifi-
cation arrangements need to be perceived as trustworthy.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is to become the key vehicle of international climate 
finance 3. Therefore, this paper discusses options how the GCF could support the roll-out 
of REFITs in the countries that require international support to implement REFITs at scale. 
In a broader perspective, Müller et al (2013b) discuss quantitative performance payments in 
the context of the GCF, which includes a brief discussion of the GET FiT pilot activity in 
Uganda, but does not focus on REFITs specifically.
Key elements that inform international financing of REFITs include
 Need for technical assistance to assess the renewable energy potential, and its cost  
structure, as well as design the administrative structure of the REFIT
 Support for political processes that overcome the resistance of incumbent electricity  
utilities and grid operators
 The cost differential between conventional electricity generation facilities and the  
different types of renewable electricity technologies, as well as adjustment procedures  
to trigger changes in the REFIT due to changes in the cost differential. 
 The duration for which the REFIT is granted
 A mechanism to allocate limited GCF resources, e.g. country ceilings or caps  
(capacity / kWh generated), above which the REFIT is no longer granted.
Given that renewable energy provides substantial ancillary benefits such as reduction of lo-
cal air pollution, an equitable approach would not cover the entire cost differential through 
GCF subsidies, but only the part of it which is not covered by ancillary benefits. 
Therefore, at this early stage, reflections on a possible institutional design of a GCF reFIt 
Facility (GrF) raise many fundamental questions, and the need to address the following 
issues: What criteria are applied in order to safeguard effective use of limited available 
funds? Which countries can access the GRF, and how? Who decides about applications? 
Should there be a differentiation according to the development level of countries? How 
should the availability of other incentives (e.g. revenues from carbon market mechanisms) 
3 No pledges to the GCF have been made so far, and its internal structure and procedures remain to be finalized. 
Most climate finance to date has flown through classical bilateral development assistance channels. We assume, 
however, that eventually the GCF will channel the lion’s share of public climate finance.
8be taken into account? Does the GRF provide finance for setting up or expanding REFITs, 
or does it provide a top-up/premium on existing or emerging REFITs, or a mix depending 
on the country context? 
Although there is a lack of clarity on the direction which the GCF will take, we will attempt 
to come up with some useful suggestions for answers to these questions. First, a brief over-
view of the evolution of the GCF will be provided (2.), followed by a brief analysis of key 
design elements of REFITs as well as related precedents (3.). This analysis forms the basis 
for the subsequent suggestions for the institutional design of a GRF (4). In conclusion, 
some thoughts on possible next steps that would move this concept closer to implementa-
tion are presented.
2. stAtus quo oF the GCF
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was first mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, 
and is being operationalized slowly following the Cancun Conference of the Parties (COP) 
to the UNFCCC in 2010. A transitional committee prepared a decision of the Durban 
COP in 2011 on the “Governing Instrument” (GCF 2011), which installed the GCF as an 
entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, and elected its Board. This institution-
al nesting in the UNFCCC institutional landscape is a significant decision, although it is 
not yet entirely clear how the institutional linkages may emerge. In 2013, Heila Cheikhrou-
hou from Tunisia became the GCF’s first director and its office in Songdo, Korea was set 
up. The UNFCCC Secretariat and the GEF Secretariat jointly set up the Interim Secretariat 
of the GCF as an autonomous unit within the UNFCCC Secretariat, which is accountable 
to the GCF Board. To date, the Board has met four times, and has produced a number of 
initial decisions.
The GCF is to channel “new, additional, adequate and predictable” international climate 
finance resources to developing countries (GCF 2011). Its key principles are guided by the 
UNFCCC, and include efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and contributing to a paradigm 
shift towards climate-resilient low-carbon development pathways (Mueller et al. 2013). 
The Governing Instrument specifies important, yet largely rudimentary rules of procedure 
for the Board, including its composition, the selection of Board members and their term, 
as well as basic rules for decision-making and observer participation; these have been 
supplemented by detailed “additional rules of procedure” (Schalatek 2013). Board meetings 
have been contentious, with North-South rifts emerging. Conflicts focus on whether the 
GCF should be the main or only a subsidiary instrument for public climate finance, the 
degree of oversight of the COP, the relevance of private finance for the GCF, and whether 
the GCF should follow the development bank model or the direct access route pioneered 
by the Adaptation Fund. Whereas industrialized country Board members prefer a “whole-
sale” model where the GCF funds are channelled through existing development banks and 
want a large role for private sector funds, developing country members would like to see 
a “retail” model with direct access and a limited role for the private sector. A key bone of 
contention has thus been the development of a “Business model framework” (BMF) which 
is to define the structure and organization of the GCF, the design of its private sector  
facility (PSF), disbursement routes and results-based financing modalities. The second 
Board meeting had decided to hire a consultancy but due to a fee seen as excessive the 
attempt aborted, and thus in the run-up to the third Board meeting submissions from 
governments and NGOs were solicited.
 
Thematically, the GCF will aim at achieving a balance between resource allocation for  
adaptation and mitigation. GCF (2013c) lists “Supporting the development, transfer and 
deployment at scale of low-carbon power generation” as a priority area for the mitigation 
side. Related performance indicators facilitate measuring achievement, and form the basis 
for the GCF’s results frameworks (GCF 2013c: 17). Related to the power sector, the BMF 
9proposes either “deployment of low-carbon technologies”, measurable e.g. in tCO2e 
reduced per kWh or in the number of households served. As REFITs typically focus on 
grid-connected electricity generation, the former is likely to be more relevant, although 
REFITs can also be adapted to mini-grid and offgrid technologies. Importantly, this indi-
cates that GCF-funded activities are intended to account for their mitigation impact, for 
which appropriate frameworks for measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) need to be 
developed. In addition, the document on performance indicators also notes that renewable 
electricity generation has been a “popular option in CDM and other climate finance initi-
atives, however, mostly on a small-scale. This makes it difficult for the Fund to carve out a 
niche.” Yet, REFITs can address important weaknesses with which the CDM has struggled  
(e.g. certainty on revenue streams, extensive baseline and additionality determination exer-
cises). Therefore, a REFIT Fund is an ideal niche for the GCF.
2.1 ACCess
The Governing Instrument (GCF 2011) states that access to funding should be “simplified 
and improved”, country-driven and include direct access (para 31). According to para 45, 
national, regional and international implementing entities accredited by the Board should 
channel resources, as well as accredited international entities (the classical development 
finance institutions, para 48). Host countries can set up National Designated Authorities 
for recommendation of funding proposals to the Board. GCF (2013a) thus sees three access 
modalities: direct access through national implementing entities (NIEs), international  
access through development finance institutions (International Implementing Entities, 
IIEs) and an “enhanced access” model where financial intermediaries, national funding 
entities (NFEs) or multilateral funding entities (MFEs) are involved before NIEs or IIEs 
engage in implementation4. 
2.2 FInAnCInG InstruMents
As per the Governing Instrument (GCF 2011) “grants and concessional lending, and other 
modalities, instruments or facilities as may be approved by the Board” (para 54) are possible. 
Thus, the Board is very flexible. GCF (2013b) lists grants, concessional loans, guarantees 
and equity investments as key options, which are then tailored in specific sub-instruments. 
The loan category is differentiated into adaptable programme loans, development policy 
loans, sector investment loans, credit lines, concessional financing for waterfall payment 
mechanisms and debt swaps.
2.3. results-bAseD FInAnCInG
GCF (2011) mentions the option of results-based financing and payment for verified results 
(para 59). Financing should “cover the identifiable additional costs of the investment 
necessary to make the project viable” (para 54). Results-based financing can have grant or 
loan elements; advanced market commitments and performance-based payments are also 
mentioned in GCF (2013b). The Board needs to apply a results measurement framework 
with guidelines and appropriate performance indicators (GCF 2011, para 58). The indica-
tors proposed by the GCF (2013c) include “deployment of low-carbon power generation 
technologies (tCO2/kWh)”. Such a criterion would fit nicely with a REFIT in which the 
number of kWh produced would be multiplied by a zero emission factor. However,  
developing country Board representatives may prefer to also take into account qualitative 
indicators which may allow for preferential treatment of activities with long-term trans-
formative effects, such as improving the climate resilience of an electricity system.
2.4 prIvAte seCtor FACIlIty
The PSF shall enable direct and indirect finance private sector mitigation (GCF 2011, 
4 See Müller (2013) for a discussion of various options for institutional design of access to GCF Funds.
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para 41), and relies on the same principles and performance indicators as the GCF. There 
shall be a focus on “local actors, including small and medium-sized enterprises and local 
financial intermediaries” (para 43). GCF (2013d) proposes the indicator of “dollars of new, 
predictable and additional private capital actually mobilized per dollar of PSF grant equiv-
alent funding” for PSF evaluation. This document (p. 7) also proposes tariff support and 
guarantees for small scale renewables in order to overcome barriers linked to the afforda-
bility of the incremental tariff the credit-worthiness of the utility that would contract the 
supply from the private sector under a long-term power purchase agreement. It explicitly 
proposes that the PSF could fund the incremental tariff. For determination of the tariff 
level it sees the option of a “reverse auction involving pre-qualified bidders” (GCF 2013d, 
p. 7), although other options are possible, as long as they ensure competitive pricing while 
safeguarding investment certainty. Thus, the PSF seems highly appropriate to become a 
REFIT support facility. This could also allow for testing co-funding through revenues from 
market mechanisms.
2.5 CrItICAl Issues
Given that the first pledges to the GCF are only likely when the key design issues have been  
agreed, it will take at least until 2014 to generate resources of a scale sufficient to finance 
transformational initiatives like REFITs. Moreover, the allocation rules could still develop  
in the direction of the Adaptation Fund. Country-level ceilings would then direct the 
resources to small countries, and make it unlikely that large-scale policy initiatives in large 
countries would receive sufficient funding. In this context, the uncritical application of the 
“common but differentiated responsibility” principle could be a barrier for a large-scale 
REFIT scheme in the absence of sufficient resources. In addition, ideological opposition 
against the PSF by some developing country representatives may also raise obstacles to the 
combination of different forms of financing from private and public sources.
Despite these considerable uncertainties about the timelines, scale, and sources of financial 
resources of the GCF, it will be assumed that levels of climate finance will flow according 
to political agreements. As the purpose of this paper is to provide suggestions on possible 
institutional design options for a GCF REFIT Facility, the focus is consequently not on 
how to raise resources, but on how they can be effectively disbursed. 
As a final brief note on the supply side of the GCF, the likely scale of required resources 
when introducing an international REFIT underlines the need for the GCF to draw on all 
available sources of finance, including from innovative sources such as carbon markets and 
international transport. The World Future Council (WFC) has contributed to this debate 
by proposing to use the ability of the IMF to create new international reserve money in 
the shape of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which could be channeled to the GCF (WFC 
2012). The IMF member states can decide on the issuance of new SDRs, which are usually 
distributed to them proportionate to their quota shares. Pursuant to agreeing on the for-
mation of the GCF, member states should agree in advance to commit all or most of the 
new SDRs to the GCF. A small portion (e.g. 10% – 20%) could be claimed by the member 
states for the financing of specific climate protection projects.
As SDRs are not usually a medium of payment, the GCF would change the newly obtained 
SDRs into the required national currencies at the respective central banks. At that moment, 
the creation of new money in the currency of the IMF (SDRs) becomes a creation of new 
money in the equivalent national currencies. The basic principle is that the new money 
should be paid only against performance, i.e. for renewable energy development (WFC 
2012).
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3. Key eleMents oF reFIts AnD 
 eFFeCtIve polICy InteGrAtIon
 
There is ample experience with implementing REFITs internationally, using international 
climate finance (GEF, Climate Investment Funds), and market mechanisms (CDM) to 
promote renewable electricity generation. The lessons will be summarized below.
3.1 DesIGn oF reFIts
 
In order to achieve a long-term transformational impact of REFITs, several challenges need 
to be addressed:5 
 Adjustment of REFITs over time through pre-determined degression rates and monitor-
ing intervals to prevent overfunding and massive expansion of renewable capacity without 
cost reduction (see Leepa and Unfried 2013 for an assessment of overfunding in the con-
text of German solar PV, as well as Zhang 2013 who sees rent seeking in many European 
REFITs).
 Differentiation of REFITs according to technologies. The exact specification of technol-
ogy becomes very important in this context and it needs to be prevented that a skewed 
definition leads to rent capture by developers of a specific technology.
 Duration of REFIT payments. The longer the duration, the higher the probability that 
financial institutions are willing to provide financing. Looking at REFIT for European 
wind power, Zhang (2013) proves empirically that a longer duration increased investment. 
However, this effect will only materialize if the government / the institution administering 
the REFIT is seen as credible
 Grid access must be actually possible and not hampered by informal barriers. Zhang 
(2013) found that a grid access guarantee had a massive impact on wind power investment 
in European countries.
While an international organization like the GCF may be better placed than national 
institutions to withstand lobby pressure, direct access modalities may allow rent seekers on 
the national level to increase their rent because the GCF will face difficulties evaluating the 
situation on the ground with regards to technology costs and nature of barriers.
3.2 preCeDents AnD lessons For GCF-supporteD  
 reFIts FroM other polICy InstruMents
The importance of the energy sector for global mitigation efforts has already resulted in 
a broad range of carbon market and climate finance activities. Generally, climate finance 
for renewable energy has been most successful when synergies between different finance 
streams could be mobilized (Castro et al. 2011). This means that REFITs should not crowd 
out other policy instruments. The following passages will consider some key lessons from 
related precedents, including the above-mentioned GET FiT pilot in Uganda, the CDM 
and the Climate Investment Funds.
The Get Fit programme introduced above is currently beginning to be piloted in Uganda, 
financed by the German development bank (KfW) and the British Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC). Barriers to be overcome are the low pre-existing FIT level 
in Uganda, a liquidity crisis at the state electricity utility that led to electricity providers 
requiring off-taker guarantees, and generally expensive debt finance. GET FiT targets small 
scale renewable electricity generation from hydro, biomass, and bagasse and is expected 
to leverage 300 million  which enable to add roughly 125 MW of renewable generation 
to the nation’s grid within the next 3 – 5 years. GET Fit pays 1-2 USDct/kWh for hydro 
5 For a more in-depth discussion of specific design options, please refer to Mendonca et al (2009) and Deutsche 
Bank (2011)
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between 1-20MW, biomass, bagasse for 20 years, organizes MIGA guarantees and provides 
a Deutsche Bank-led debt facility. 50% of the net present value of the FIT subsidy will be 
paid up-front, the rest in subsequent instalments every five years (KfW 2012). The blend of 
output-based payments with grant components is an excellent example for how a pilot FIT 
activity can be financially structured in low-income countries. 
Unfortunately, however, the GET FiT pilot in Uganda is setting a negative precedent as it 
does not allow projects receiving the FIT subsidy to utilize the CDM. Some of the eligible 
power plants had already been developed as CDM projects prior to GET FiT, and have 
sometimes even received public assistance for CDM capacity building activities from the 
same institutions that now finance GET FiT, for instance through the CDM SPEAR PoA. 
Due to the dominance of renewable energy projects in the global CDM portfolio, it can be 
expected that many of the most attractive FIT eligible projects have already been targeted 
as CDM projects or Programme of Activities (PoA). Therefore, some key aspects about 
possible interactions of a FIT Facility with the CDM will briefly be considered next.
 
The Clean Development Mechanism has now registered more than 7000 projects. 
70% of these activities support renewable energy (URC 2013), mainly grid-connected 
renewable electricity generation. As of July 2013, the CDM pipeline includes projects and 
PoAs that would deliver an aggregated installed capacity of biomass (11.0 GW), geothermal 
(2.6 GW), hydro (115.0 GW), solar (7.9 GW), and wind (119.9 GW) (URC 2013). Some 
of these projects may become victims of the current carbon market price depression, or 
due to domestic challenges. Still, this noteworthy number of projects and their aggregated 
scale underlines the need to explore how CDM will interact with other mechanisms such 
as REFITs. From a CDM policy perspective, however, recent decisions on host country 
domestic energy policies clearly allow for linking CDM with REFITs for projects submitted 
for registration during the first seven years of their implementation. Moreover, the CDM 
provides a vast pool of regulatory experience and methodological tools, which could also 
be useful for instance to determine the mitigation impact of activities that are supported by 
a REFIT. Therefore, for the purposes this paper, the CDM will be mainly considered as a 
source of experience and as a methodological toolbox rather than a source of revenue. It is 
worth noting, however, that the latest GCF private sector facility decisions already include 
thoughts on PSF guarantee prices for CERs in order to mitigate uncertainty and allow to 
draw on carbon markets for co-financing (GCF 2013d: 7). From the perspective of the 
CDM’s regulatory framework, a combination of CDM revenues with a REFIT is possible 
as long as all revenue streams are factored into a credible demonstration of additionality in 
the specific country circumstances.
Using the South African Power Pool as an example, Burian and Arens (2012) suggest  
another possible combination of a REFIT and carbon credit revenues, which would partly 
make the level of payments depending on carbon reductions rather than price increment.  
This arrangement could result in negative trade-offs with efficiency and investment certainty,  
and furthermore disadvantage low-income countries with a relatively high share of hydro- 
power, which frequently corresponds with suppressed demand. 
The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) (Clean Technology Fund, Strategic Climate Fund) 
are the largest multilateral vehicles for international climate finance support for renewable  
energy. The CIF have stopped short of financing REFITs directly, and have followed 
established project financing practices of multilateral development banks relatively closely. 
While there are efforts to pursue a country-driven approach, there is no MRV system in 
place that would consistently measure mitigation impacts.
 
Yet, as the GCF aims to become a major contributor to mitigation efforts, it can be antic-
ipated that there will be demands that mitigation effects will need to be measured more 
accurately. In this context, the concept of “supported nAMAs” could provide  
UNFCCC-compatible MRV frameworks, as well as contribute to mobilizing (bilateral) 
funding for REFITs. Therefore, it is recommended to design GCF-supported REFITs as 
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supported NAMAs. Actually, when the concept of NAMAs was still very young, Edkins 
et al. (2009) proposed to fund deployment of concentrating solar power in South Africa 
through a NAMA with a REFIT. However, due to political uncertainty about the future 
climate regime, the concept is only now beginning to move towards implementation.  
An increasing number of developing countries have now begun to develop NAMAs.  
Still, there continues to be an absence of regulatory guidance and modalities for NAMAs, 
as well as substantial financial support. Therefore, many NAMA concepts draw directly on 
CDM tools, e.g. for establishing baselines and MRV procedures. The CDM’s methodolog-
ical tools to determine baselines for grid-connected electricity generation and for monitor-
ing performance are among the most streamlined (UNFCCC 2012). Therefore, it would be 
relatively simple to adjust these tools to the requirements of a REFIT MRV framework as 
part of a supported NAMA, which would not generate carbon credits, but provide informa-
tion that is requested in the GCF performance indicators (Mt CO2 reduction/kWh). 
Importantly, the relevance of this “mitigation layer” can be expected to increase in impor-
tance, as the 2015 agreement will have to place a higher share of the mitigation burden 
upon the shoulders of developing countries, according to formulas that still have to be 
determined. Still, it is already clear that it will be important to have robust and coherent 
accounting frameworks and MRV procedures in place in order to allow for comparability 
of efforts and to prevent double-counting of emission reductions.
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4. ConCept For FIt support by  
 the GCF reFIt FACIlIty
This section will develop a concept for how a dedicated GCF REFIT Facility that can use 
the GCF Secretariat could support REFITs in developing countries, taking into account the 
key challenges discussed in the sections above. 
4.1  CrIterIA For support oF FIts In orDer to prevent  
 overFunDInG
The REFIT support must fulfil the GCF criterion of covering the additional costs of a 
project to make it financially viable. This means that the GCF Board should decide on the 
principle that a REFIT will only be supported if it is not higher than the level required to 
make renewable electricity projects just competitive.
The decision parameters are shown in Figure 1. The upper downward-sloping curve shows 
the development of the levelized electricity costs of a renewable electricity technology over 
time, the lower curve those of the cheapest conventional electricity generation technology; 
it is assumed that the characteristics of the electricity from both technologies are the same.  
It is important to note that fuel costs for conventional electricity generation could risein 
the future, which could also lead to increasing conventional electricity generation costs. 
Such a development would make renewable electricity generation cost-competitive more 
rapidly.  
The renewable electricity project 1 starting at time A will need a REFIT of level a for the 
time period A-b to become competitive with the fossil alternative. Thus the ideal level of 
support by the GRF is the blue rectangle A-b, a-c. However, some renewable lobby groups 
will try to increase the REFIT to the level a+r in order to capture rent. The GRF must be 
able to identify such attempts.
Renewable electricity project 2 starting at time C will only need a FIT of level b for the 
time period C-D to become competitive with the fossil alternative. Now, the ideal level  
of support by the GRF is the blue rectangle C-D, b-d, much less than the support for  
project 1. Had the REFIT level remained at level a, an enormous rent would accrue. At 
time e the costs become equal (“grid parity”). From that time, no REFIT is needed any-
more, as renewables are fully competitive. 
Figure 1: IDeAl support level For FIt over tIMe
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4.2  evAluAtIon oF the Key pArAMeters oF FIts  
 by the GrF 
The REFIT support must be country-driven. Thus, the GRF will only act on the request by  
a government to support a REFIT. The GRF could support preparation and implemen-
tation of the REFIT, as well as the extension of an existing scheme, many of which are 
capped at a certain level of generation capacity due to budget constraints. The GRF should 
provide templates for support requests, and a procedure with clear timelines and responsi-
bilities for evaluation of the proposals and decisions on whether support will be granted. 
Such procedures need to be transparent, and consider the multilateral context in which the 
GCF operates. Mueller et al (2013, p.8) lay out proposals for how requests can be dealt  
with, e.g. in a first-come, first-serve mode, in the form of “beauty contests”, or even auctions. 
These criteria can be differentiated according to “respective capacities” of different coun-
tries (e.g. low-middle-high-income country). 
To evaluate proposals for REFIT implementation support, the GCF Secretariat must be 
enabled to draw on an adequate technical support structure which has the skills to evaluate 
the following critical parameters of a REFIT (see also Heinrich Boell Foundation et al. 
2013, pp. 14ff for an in-depth discussion of these parameters):
1. tariff rate per kWh, and procedures for changing this rate for new power generation 
projects, as costs fall (see Figure 1). Heinrich Boell Foundation et al. (2013, p. 17) argue 
that the tariff should be based on the actual cost of generation plus a premium that allows 
sufficient returns on investment (usually 5-10% in the European context). The calculation 
of costs should not exclude relevant categories, meaning that investment costs, grid (con-
nection)-related and administrative costs for licenses, operation and maintenance costs, fuel 
costs and decommissioning costs have to be covered.
2. In order to keep investor confidence, a regular schedule (e.g. every 2 years) for updating 
for new projects should be communicated from the start. 
3. Differentiation by technology and scale: Precise definitions of eligible technology, and 
procedures for changing these definitions as technologies evolve. Unexpected technological 
breakthroughs, which may result in significant cost reductions, may create a big potential  
for rent seeking, if not acted upon quickly. Technology definitions can include size thresholds.  
Commonly, large hydropower plants have been excluded from REFITs on the grounds that 
they are already competitive. Where large plants are not excluded, they often get a lower REFIT.
4. Duration of REFIT payments (typically 15-20 years), and procedures for changing this 
duration for new power generation projects, as lifetimes of technologies change.
5. Necessity of guarantees for payment of power offtake. The GRF could link payment of 
REFIT support to the existence of a guarantee facility.
6. Availability of grid access, both in regulatory and physical terms – only once this is 
proven, would REFIT support be made available. This may include guidance on risks and 
responsibilities in case of defaulting (e.g. compensation payments if electricity cannot be 
transmitted or consumed by the utility). 
7. Financing modality of the cost differential between conventional and renewable elec-
tricity remaining after the GRF contribution is deducted – progressive distribution of this 
financing according to the level of development (i.e. respective capacity). Structuring of 
support, blending of grants and loans. 
8. Credibility of institution disbursing the REFIT funds, which could be a NIE under the 
GCF. The institution would have to prove that it fulfils relevant fiduciary and accountabil-
ity standards. It would have to be discussed whether NIEs have to fulfil the same stand-
ards as IIEs. In order to promote direct access, blending with other investment guarantee 
vehicles may be required (GCF 2013d: 7).
evaluation of FIt proposals by the GrF
There are three possibilities for evaluation: a) the GCF Secretariat does the evaluation  
inhouse, b) it commissions expert reviews, or c) it requires proponents to do an independ-
ent audit by a GCF-accredited auditor. 
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The inhouse option seems unrealistic as GCF staff will be unable to understand country- 
specific details that influence the key parameters. Commissioning of expert reviews seems 
promising as long as the roster of experts can cover specific expertise for all countries that 
apply. The GCF could provide a call for experts; it would have to be ensured that experts 
do not have a conflict of interest and that remuneration is sufficiently attractive to get good 
quality outcomes. This would be similar to the German system where tariff levels require 
studies by independent research institutions. The audit option has been applied under the 
CDM by establishing a system in which the CDM Executive Board accredited designated 
auditors (Designated Operational Entities, DOE). After initial problems, this arrangement 
became universally accepted. Transferring it to the GCF, however, will generate relatively  
high costs, unless domestic actors in the respective host country are more strongly involved.
Decision-making on proposals could be done on the level of a GCF reFIt Facility com-
mittee of the PSF. This committee could consist of two GCF Board members, two mem-
bers of the highest body of the PSF, and two renewable energy policy experts, one each 
from a GCF donor and GCF recipient country. The GCF Board should only decide on the 
set of criteria and the evaluation principles. CDM experience has shown that deciding on 
specific proposals by the Board can lead to a high workload of the Board and its inability 
to decide on ground rules, whereas delegation of work into committees like the Meth Panel 
has enabled rapid development of a robust set of methodologies. As the UNFCCC and 
the GEF Secretariats form the interim GCF Secretariat, direct lesson-learning exercises may 
be desirable and possible.
the need for flexible and scalable frameworks
A relevant challenge will be to agree on criteria such as a maximum amount of funding 
being allocated to a specific REFIT and the parameters that could trigger a funding cap.  
Experience in industrialized countries have shown that capacity caps for REFITs led to 
“boom and bust” cycles that are deleterious to the renewables industry. Another key param-
eter is the share of the cost differential covered by the GCF. Here, country differentia-
tion as per level of development could be implemented. For example, LDCs could receive 
full coverage, middle-income countries a significant coverage while advanced developing 
countries only a smaller share. The classification of countries as well as the shares funded 
for each class would have to be discussed in the negotiations about funding of the GCF 
given that the instrument could take up a significant share of the GCF’s resources.
table 1 below gives a rough estimate of the order of magnitude of payments a FIT would 
require depending on the size of the resource and the cost differential, as well as the share 
of cost differential covered by the GCF. The LDC example assumes an African country 
that expands hydro, with the entire cost differential being covered by the GCF. The middle 
income country (MIC) example would expand wind power in the trade wind zone; it 
would get coverage of half of the cost gap. The advanced developing country (ADC) has 
a mix of hydro and wind power potential, which is large. 20% of the cost gap would be 
covered by the GCF. 
table 1: IllustrAtIve exAMples For FunDInG requIreMent For GCF reFIt
Country type Installed 
renewables 
capacity 
(Mw)
plant load 
factor 
(%)
Cost  
differential  
( ct/kwh)
share of cost 
differential 
covered  
by GCF (%)
type  of 
support
total GCF 
financing 
need (mil-
lion  p.a.)
lDC 100 70 2 100 Grant 12.1
MIC 5000 40 4 50 Grant and 
concessional 
loan
350.4
ADC 30000 50 3 20 Concessional 
loan
788.4
Note: The scale difference between the different country categories is not pre-determined; it is just frequently the case 
that the economically viable potential is higher in a large ADC than a small LDC.
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The examples show that financing of REFITs requires significant resources even if the cost 
differential is small and only a part of it is covered by the GCF. Annual disbursements 
for REFITs in a dozen countries can therefore easily reach several billion ; they need to 
be sustained over several decades. If there is a front-loading of the whole or part of the 
REFIT payment towards the start of the project as in the case of the Ugandan GET FiT, 
the required short term funding would increase substantially. Front loading is problematic 
inasmuch it reduces incentives to operate the plant sustainably.
Institutional structure of GrF disbursements
Relying on domestic structures may allow for reducing the administrative burden on the 
GRF, while strengthening host country ownership (Müller et al 2013). This draws attention 
to the role of NFEs and NIE. There is a rapidly increasing number of emerging national 
climate funds, such as the Bangladeshi Climate Change Resilience Fund, the Brazilian Am-
azon Fund, or the Ethiopian CRGE Facility, which could serve as NFEs. Such an arrange-
ment would allow designing a REFIT in a direct access model, in which a national climate 
fund is accredited as the NFE. These NFEs would then transfer these GCF resources to 
executing entities – i.e. developers of renewable electricity generation projects - based en-
tirely on performance, e.g. as a premium to a domestic REFIT. As mentioned above, these 
activities would require an additional MRV layer that measures mitigation impacts as part 
of a supported NAMA framework. However, these NAMA components could also be coor-
dinated by the NFE. Additional efforts can be expected to be small, as the main parameter 
is the amount of generated electricity which is monitored anyways, as well as the baseline 
for emission reductions. Figure 2 visualizes a simplified version of these arrangements, 
taking into account the differentiation in the share of the cost gap covered by the REFIT. 
Figure 2: reFIt DIsburseMent struCture
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These NFEs are likely to require some form of institutional capacity building support, 
but as they are already being set up and can be anticipated to seek GCF funding, it would 
be the most efficient arrangement to involve them. This institutional capacity could also 
facilitate disbursement for further GCF thematic windows. 
Blending upfront and performance-based financing elements such as in the Ugandan 
GETFiT pilot may provide sufficient incentives to operate activities sustainably over the 
relatively long timelines. As concessional loans and grants are likely to be combined in a 
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large number of countries, the repayments of the loans contribute to replenishment. This 
would essentially create a revolving fund, which is an important precondition to reach the 
necessary scale.
5. whAt CAn be ApproprIAte  
 next steps?
A prompt start that enables participants to build on practical experiences from pilot activ-
ities is an ideal precondition to build an evolving flexible and scalable design for a GCF 
REFIT Facility. Therefore, with the first funding of the GCF and the establishment of the 
PSF, a pilot REFIT support procedure should be set up. Ideally, it would support up to 
3 small-medium sized countries, respectively, at different stages of development, and its  
results should be used to fine-tune the rules for broader REFIT support from 2015 onwards. 
Building on the initial proposal by the World Future Council (WFC 2009), we recommend 
to set up a multilateral trust fund for such a pilot. Such a fund could be set up directly as a 
GCF multilateral funding entity, or, if procedural constraints appear to be too prohibitive, 
also outside of the direct GCF context, but with clear trajectory towards an integration into 
the GCF’s institutional landscape. An example using simple assumptions based on recent 
numbers for key parameters such as cost differential between technologies and plant load 
factors (see e.g. IPCC 2011) follows. If the duration of the REFIT payments is 15 years, the 
cost differential between renewables and conventional electricity technologies reaches  
3 ct and if the average share of cost differential covered reaches 50% the fund would need 
1 billion  to fund close to 5 TWh per year. This could fund 2.85 GW of wind at 20% load 
factor, but only 0.76 GW of hydro at 75% load factor.
A procedure that is transparent and prevents overfunding should allow for building suffi-
cient trust for industrialized countries to provide funding for a GCF REFIT support pro-
gramme that would then expand to a scale where REFITs in large countries could realisti-
cally be covered. A REFIT programme for 100 GW, which is consistent with the expansion 
levels seen for the 2020s by IPCC (2011), at a load factor of 50% and a cost differential 
of 3 ct would require 1.3 billion  per year if the full cost differential is covered; and this 
would have to be sustained over two decades. Such a REFIT programme should be framed 
under the concept of supported NAMAs, in order to make mitigation impacts transparent 
and quantifiable.
Setting up such a pilot REFIT Facility is likely to require a related institutional capacity  
building programme. Although many countries may have domestic experience with  
REFITs, the evolving GCF procedures are likely to require external support at least in the 
less advanced developing countries. Importantly, institutional and human capacity building 
needs also apply to the GCF itself, as the robust administration of such a large amount of 
financial resources requires not only the development of relevant procedures , but also a 
significant number of qualified personnel (Müller 2013, Ciplet et al. 2010)
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that the GCF would be an ideal institution to 
promote renewable energy REFITs in developing countries. As mentioned initially, there 
needs to be a certain degree of caution with regard to when the GCF will be sufficiently 
capitalized. Mobilizing climate finance is a key issue of the UNFCCC process, and a range 
of proposals for possible sources of finance have been tabled, which also include the WFC 
(2012) proposal to issue IMF special drawing rights. 
The comprehensive experience with REFITs, and their acceptance in many countries 
around the world offers the GCF a promising opportunity to successfully set up perfor-
mance-based pilot activities which can also build trust in the GCF, thereby accelerating the 
process for other thematic windows and its overall success and effectiveness. 
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